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A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION: HOW SUN CAPITAL’S TRADE 
OR BUSINESS DECISION COULD PROMOTE COMMON SENSE 
AND FAIR TREATMENT UNDER THE TAX CODE 
The First Circuit’s decision in Sun Capital1 burst onto the scene last 
summer, reenergizing the debate over the favorable tax treatment of private 
equity funds. While commentators jumped at the opportunity to discuss the 
case’s possible tax implications, they stopped short of considering its relevance 
in light of America’s growing economic inequality.2 Since the start of the 
Great Recession, the federal government has subsidized America’s “one 
percent” at the expense of the rest in at least two ways. First, the Federal 
Reserve’s (the “Fed”) bond buying program spurred inflation in the value of 
stock and consumer goods without spurring corresponding wage inflation.3 
This has allowed the private equity industry to thrive on the sale of inflated 
stock prices, while working Americans struggle with less purchasing power.4 
Second, the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) taxes the income from the sale of 
inflated stock5 at lower rates than wages earned by working Americans.6 But 
private equity firms exert the same type of effort to earn their income as 
ordinary Americans. So why should an industry exclusive to the country’s 
wealthiest be rewarded with tax windfalls not enjoyed by the average 
 
 1. Sun Capital Partners III, LP v. New England Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension 
Fund, 724 F.3d 129 (1st Cir. 2013). 
 2. America’s economic inequality is growing. See Annie Lowry, The Wealth Gap in 
America Is Growing, Too, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2014, http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/ 
04/02/the-wealth-gap-is-growing-too/; Drew DeSilver, U.S. Income Inequality, on Rise for 
Decades, is now Highest Since 1928, PEW RES. CTR., Dec. 5, 2013, http://www.pewresearch. 
org/fact-tank/2013/12/05/u-s-income-inequality-on-rise-for-decades-is-now-highest-since-1928/. 
Private equity plays a role in that growth. See Growing Apart, ECONOMIST, Sep. 21, 2013, 
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21586578-americas-income-inequality-growing-again-
time-cut-subsidies-rich-and-invest. 
 3. See infra text accompanying notes 219–21 (discussing the economic impact of the 
monetary policy as it relates to the impact of the tax policy). 
 4. See infra text accompanying notes 219–21 (discussing the economic impact of the 
monetary policy as it relates to the impact of the tax policy). Private equity is not the sole 
beneficiary of inflated financial asset prices. However, to fully understand the benefit created by 
the taxation of the industry, it is important to consider the effects of other governmental policies. 
 5. Stock is treated as a capital asset; the sale of stock held for a minimum of one year is 
treated as a capital gain. I.R.C. §§ 1221(a)(1), 1222(3) (2012). 
 6. Ordinary income is taxed at a maximum rate of 39.6%, while capital gains are taxed at a 
maximum rate of 20%. I.R.C. § 1(a)–(h) (2012). 
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American? This note’s policy discussion explores the relationship between the 
Fed’s monetary policy, the tax code, and the Sun Capital decision. By 
recognizing that private firms are active managers rather than passive 
investors,7 the First Circuit provides a potential mechanism for helping slow 
America’s economic inequality. 
In Sun Capital, the First Circuit confirmed what those opposing the 
taxation of private equity had long contended: that private equity funds are 
trades or businesses.8 Currently, however, they are not treated as trades or 
businesses, but as passive investors.9 This allows much of the income 
generated by private equity funds to be treated as capital gains and taxed at the 
capital gains rate, which is about 20% less than the rate at which ordinary 
income is taxed.10 Further, because private equity funds are organized as 
partnerships, the income they generate retains its character as it flows through 
to the partners.11 This allows the partners to pay tax on the income at the 
reduced capital gains rate instead of their marginal tax rate, which would vary 
depending on each partner’s ordinary income.12 Most individual private equity 
partners are extremely wealthy13 and are thus reducing their tax rate from 
39.6%—the highest ordinary income rate14—to 20%—the capital gains rate.15 
 
 7. Sun Capital Partners III, LP v. New England Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension 
Fund, 724 F.3d 129, 133 (1st Cir. 2013). 
 8. Id. Compare Steven Davidoff Solomon, A Chance to End a Billion-Dollar Tax Break for 
Private Equity, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2013, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/10/22/chance-to-
end-billion-dollar-tax-break-for-private-equity/ (suggesting Sun Capital provides a chance for the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to change its treatment of private equity funds), with Victor 
Fleischer, Sun Capital Court Ruling Threatens Structure of Private Equity, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 
2013, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/08/01/sun-capital-court-ruling-threatens-private-equity-
structure/, and Steven M. Rosenthal, Private Equity is a Business: Sun capital and Beyond, TAX 
NOTES, Sept. 23, 2013, at 1459, 1460 (suggesting private equity funds are trades or businesses), 
with Steve Judge, Why a Pension Case Will Not Change Private Equity Tax Law, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 4, 2013, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/11/04/why-a-pension-case-will-not-change-pri 
vate-equity-tax-law (criticizing the notion that Sun Capital may upend the tax treatment of private 
equity funds), and Partnership Taxation, PRIVATE EQUITY GROWTH CAPITAL COUNCIL, 
http://www.pegcc.org/issues/private-equity-and-tax-policy/private-equity-partnership-taxation/ 
(last visited Feb. 17, 2014) [hereinafter PEGCC] (advocacy organization representing several 
private equity firms), and Lee A. Sheppard, The Sun Capital Decision in Perspective, TAX 
ANALYSTS, Sept. 27. 2013, http://www.taxanalysts.com/www/features.nsf/Articles/8B05403F57 
33231385257BF3004B0C78?OpenDocument. 
 9. I.R.C. §§ 1221–22 (2012); Fleischer, supra note 8. 
 10. I.R.C. § 1(a)–(h) (2012); Fleischer, supra note 8; Rosenthal, supra note 8, at 1459–60. 
 11. I.R.C. §§ 701, 702, 703(a)(1), 704(a) (2012); WILLIAM H. HOFFMAN, JR. ET AL., 
CORPORATIONS, PARTNERSHIPS, ESTATES & TRUSTS 10-4 (2014). 
 12. I.R.C. § 1(a)–(h) (2012). 
 13. See Emily Thorton, Private-Equity Paychecks May Set Record, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK, Oct. 29, 2006, http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2006-10-29/online-extra-
private-equity-paychecks-may-set-record. 
 14. I.R.C. § 1(a)–(e) (2012). 
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To retain their coveted classification as passive investors, private equity 
funds rely on the IRS to treat the stock of the companies that they invest in as a 
capital asset.16 Property held for sale to customers in the ordinary course of a 
trade or business is not a capital asset.17 Therefore, if private equity funds were 
treated as trades or businesses, a majority of the industry’s income would be 
treated as ordinary income instead of capital gains. In other words, private 
equity’s favorable tax treatment relies on an industry comprised of 
multibillion-dollar businesses not being treated as trades or businesses for tax 
purposes. Although not a tax case,18 Sun Capital provides an opportunity for 
the IRS to start treating private equity funds as trades or businesses, thus 
stripping the industry of its tax windfall.19 The First Circuit threatened the 
treatment by holding that one of the Sun Capital private equity partnerships 
was a trade or business for ERISA (Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act) purposes. Significantly, if the same rationale was applied for tax 
purposes—that is, if the IRS were to classify private equity funds as trades or 
businesses—funds could lose the passive investor status that entitles them to 
treat their income as capital gains.20 More significantly, while the court limited 
its holding to ERISA contexts,21 it relied heavily on a string of tax cases in 
finding that the fund was a trade or business.22 Sun Capital and its potential 
impact on private equity is especially relevant considering American’s growing 
inequality,23 the ongoing debate over tax rates in general, and the favorable tax 
rates enjoyed by private equity fund managers.24 
 
 15. I.R.C. § 1(h)(1)(D) (2012). 
 16. I.R.C. §§ 1(h), 163(d)(5), 1231(a)(3)(A)(ii)(I), 1221(a)(1) (2012). 
 17. I.R.C. § 1221(a)(1) (2012). 
 18. Sun Capital Partners III, LP v. New England Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension 
Fund, 724 F.3d 129, 148–49 (1st Cir. 2013) (reaching its conclusion by applying tax precedent to 
define “trade or business” for ERISA purposes). 
 19. See Solomon, supra note 8; see also Higgins v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 312 U.S. 
212, 217 (1941) (“The Bureau of Internal Revenue has this duty of determining what is carrying 
on a business.”). 
 20. See I.R.C. §§ 1(h), 163(d)(5), 1231(a)(3)(A)(ii)(I), 1221(a)(1) (2012). 
 21. Sun Capital, 724 F.3d at 148–49. 
 22. Id. at 144–46. 
 23. Lowry, supra note 2; DeSilver, supra note 2; Growing Apart, supra note 2. 
 24. Solomon, supra note 8; see generally Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing 
Partnership Profits in Private Equity Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2008); Richard Rubin & Jesse 
Drucker, Romney’s 13.9% Tax Rate Shows Power of Investment Tax Preference, BLOOMBERG 
PERS. FIN., Jan. 24, 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-24/romney-paid-13-9-per 
cent-tax-rate-on-21-6-million-2010-income.html; William Alden, House Proposal Would Raise 
Taxes on Private Equity Income, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2014, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/ 
02/26/house-proposal-would-raise-taxes-on-private-equity-income/; Dan Primack, The Case for 
Raising Taxes on Private Equity, FORTUNE, July 8, 2011, http://fortune.com/2011/07/08/the-case-
for-raising-taxes-on-private-equity/; D.M. Levine, Obama Tax Plan Would Raise Taxes On 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
468 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXIV:465 
The Obama administration has publically, and legislatively, criticized this 
benefit for several years.25 However, attempts to legislatively change the 
favorable tax treatment have been stalled by a Congress strongly opposed to 
raising tax rates.26 Now, as commentators suggest, Sun Capital may pave the 
way for the administration to bypass Congress and tax private equity funds as 
trade or businesses—making their income taxable at ordinary rates.27 Whether 
or not the administration takes up the fight against some of the country’s 
deepest pockets is another question.28 
This note first provides a background of the private equity industry and its 
tax treatment, in an effort to illustrate the potential applicability of the Sun 
Capital rationale to tax situations. The note then discusses the decision itself, 
focusing on the line of tax cases analyzed by the court. Next, it argues that 
private equity funds should be taxed as trades or businesses. Finally, it 
addresses the policy issues, for and against, a change in treatment. 
I.  BACKGROUND OF PRIVATE EQUITY TAXATION AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF 
“TRADE OR BUSINESS” 
A. Private Equity in General 
Private equity firms pool capital from investors—some wealthy individuals 
but mostly institutions and other funds—to purchase a controlling interest in 
the stock of companies with a goal of reselling it for a gain after a few years.29 
Because private equity firms typically organize as limited partnerships,30 
investors retaining the status of limited partner are absolved of any liability in 
excess of their investment.31 Limited partners are not involved with the 
 
Private Equity And Hedge Fund Chiefs, HUFFINGTON POST, Feb. 22, 2012, http://www.huffing 
tonpost.com/2012/02/22/obama-tax-plan_n_1294003.html. 
 25. Rubin & Drucker, supra note 24; Alden, supra note 24; Levine, supra note 24. 
 26. Solomon, supra note 8. 
 27. See Solomon, supra note 8; Fleischer, supra note 8; Rosenthal, supra note 8. 
 28. See Solomon, supra note 8. 
 29. See DONALD J. MARPLES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 22689, TAXATION OF HEDGE 
FUND AND PRIVATE EQUITY MANAGERS (2014) (The CRS report by Donald Marples is 
referenced heavily because the taxation of private equity funds is a hotly debated political topic, 
and the Congressional Research Services is a nonpartisan research body. Therefore, this report is 
referenced to avoid politically biased facts.); see also PEGCC, supra note 8 (The PEGCC is the 
advocacy institution for the private equity industry. This source is used throughout for two 
reasons: (1) because private equity is private (except for a few publically held partnerships), firms 
typically do not make much information public; and (2) by using the statements on the industry’s 
advocacy organization’s website to make arguments, the author aims to prevent opponents from 
claiming that fact statements herein inaccurately reflect the industry.). 
 30. MARPLES, supra note 29, at 2–3; Fleischer, supra note 8. 
 31. 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 557 (2014). 
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management of the invested funds or the companies purchased with them.32 
Often, and specifically in the case of the Sun Capital funds, the general 
partners are organized as partnerships or LLCs, not individuals.33 Typically, 
management teams comprised of consultants are hired by the general manager 
from a parent organization to work on the purchased companies.34 The parent 
organization is often organized as a corporation.35 The general partners also 
typically contribute capital, but their primary contribution is in managing the 
fund’s investments.36 This layered entity approach serves to shield the funds’ 
investors from tax, ERISA, and other obligations of the funds.37 
General partners seek out struggling businesses, purchase them, and then 
reorganize and guide the businesses’ strategies until they are resold for a profit 
or loss.38 Often, management teams are assembled and specific strategic plans 
are designed prior to purchasing a company.39 After a company is acquired, the 
management team works to increase the company’s value by reorganizing the 
company’s management, operations, and financial structure.40 In the Sun 
Capital case, the funds’ involvement in the investment company encompassed 
details as small as signing checks and holding meetings with staff to discuss 
operations, competition, and personnel decisions.41 
B. The Taxation of Private Equity 
Because private equity funds are organized as partnerships, they are not 
taxed at the entity level; partnerships are not taxable entities.42 Instead, income 
or loss flows from the partnership without being taxed, to the partners, while 
 
 32. Id. 
 33. Amanda N. Persaud & Adrienne Atkinson, Private Equity Finds: Legal Analysis of 
Structural, ERISA, Securities and Other Regulatory Issues, in INVESTMENT ADVISER 
REGULATION 47-1, 47-10 (Clifford E. Kirsch ed., 3rd ed. 2012), available at http://www.wlrk. 
com/webdocs/wlrknew/AttorneyPubs/WLRK.21704.12.pdf. 
 34. See id. at 47-4, 47-5. 
 35. See Sun Capital Partners III, LP v. New England Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension 
Fund, 724 F.3d 129, 133–35 (1st Cir. 2013) for an example of one such fund’s structure. 
 36. Persaud & Atkinson, supra note 33, at 47-4, 47-5; MARPLES, supra note 29, at 3; Steven 
M. Rosenthal, Taxing Private Equity Funds as Corporate Developers, in TAX NOTES 361, 361 
(Jan. 21, 2013). 
 37. See Persaud & Atkinson, supra note 33, at 47-20, 47-21, 47-22. 
 38. MARPLES, supra note 29, at 1; see also Persaud & Atkinson, supra note 33, at 47-4. 
 39. Persaud & Atkinson, supra note 33, at 47-4; see also Sun Capital, 724 F.3d at 133–35 
(explaining the Sun Funds’ strategy). 
 40. MARPLES, supra note 29, at 1–2; see also Sun Capital, 724 F.3d at 133–35 (explaining 
the Sun Funds’ strategy). 
 41. Sun Capital, 724 F.3d at 142. 
 42. I.R.C. § 701 (2012) (“A partnership as such shall not be subject to the income tax 
imposed by this chapter. Persons carrying on business as partners shall be liable for income tax 
only in their separate or individual capacities.”). 
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retaining its character.43 This is commonly referred to as flow-through or pass-
through treatment.44 For example, if a partnership generates capital gains as 
opposed to ordinary income, the income flows to the partners’ individual tax 
returns as capital gains.45 In the case of private equity, firms purchase the stock 
of investment companies and then sell that stock a few years later, generating 
capital gains.46 Under partnership tax principles, this income is distributed to 
the limited and general partners, all of whom report it as capital gains.47 
Private equity funds and their partners save billions by being taxed at the 
preferential capital gains rate,48 which of course, requires the sale of a capital 
asset.49 In order to be considered a capital asset, stock must not be: (1) held by 
the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers, or (2) in the ordinary course of a 
trade or business.50 Therefore, if the IRS applied the First Circuit’s reasoning 
and classified private equity funds as trades or businesses, funds would be one 
step closer to losing the passive investor status that entitles them to capital 
gains.51 The other step would be to treat the stock held by private equity firms 
as “held primarily for sale to customers.”52 Together, these two steps would 
end the favorable tax treatment of income generated by private equity funds. 
II.  THE SUN CAPITAL DECISION 
A. The Structure of the Sun Capital Private Equity Firm 
Sun Capital Advisers, Inc. (SCAI) is a private equity firm led by co-CEOs 
and sole shareholders Marc Leder and Rodger Krouse.53 SCAI employs about 
123 professionals to find investors and pool their money into funds organized 
as limited partnerships to purchase companies.54 SCAI professionals select 
 
 43. See I.R.C. § 701 (2012); see also PEGCC, supra note 8 (explaining that income and 
losses “flow through” to each partner and are taxed at the individual level). 
 44. PEGCC, supra note 8. 
 45. See I.R.C. § 702(b) (2012) (explaining that tax attributes flow from the partnership to the 
individual partners); see also MARPLES, supra note 29, at 4. 
 46. MARPLES, supra note 29, at 1–2. 
 47. Id. at 4–5. 
 48. Solomon, supra note 8 (commenting that the heads of private equity firms pay billions of 
dollars less in taxes because capital gains are taxed at a rate about 20% less than ordinary 
income). 
 49. I.R.C §§ 1231 (2012). 
 50. Rosenthal, supra note 36, at 363 (citing I.R.C. § 1221(a)(1) (2012)). 
 51. See generally Sun Capital Partners III, LP v. New England Teamsters & Trucking Indus. 
Pension Fund, 724 F.3d 129, 137–49 (1st Cir. 2013) (explaining the First Circuit’s reasoning 
regarding the meaning of “trade or business”); Rosenthal, supra note 36, at 365 (“[P]rivate equity 
funds are active enough to be in a trade or business.”). 
 52. See Rosenthal, supra note 36, at 362–63. 
 53. Sun Capital, 724 F.3d at 133. 
 54. Id. 
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investment companies for the funds to purchase and handle the negotiation and 
finalization of the deals.55 Once deals are finalized, SCAI contracts with its 
subsidiary management companies to provide purchased companies with 
management and consulting services.56 Like other private equity funds, the 
goal is to improve the value of the companies, then sell them for a profit.57 
In Sun Capital, two SCAI-affiliated private equity funds (the “Sun Funds” 
or the “Funds”) acquired Scott Brass, Inc. (SBI).58 The Sun Funds had no 
offices or employees of their own, and were managed by SCAI-affiliated 
general partners.59 The general partners held authority relating to hiring, 
terminating, and compensating employees and agents of SBI.60 For their 
services, the general partners were entitled to an annual management fee equal 
to 2% of the total capital committed to the Funds.61 Immediately after 
acquisition, the general partners managed the Funds using subsidiary 
management companies that employed SCAI professionals.62 The management 
companies and SBI then entered into contracts whereby the subsidiary 
management companies provided SBI with the SCAI-employed 
professionals.63 In return, SBI paid an annual fee to the management 
companies.64 One of the Sun Funds received an offset or discount from the fees 
it owed the general partner in the amount of the fees paid to the management 
companies by SBI.65 Therefore, in effect, that Fund received an additional 
return in the form of free management of its asset.66 
B. Facts and the Raising of the “Trade or Business” Issue 
Pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, SBI had ongoing 
obligations to contribute to the New England Trucking and Teamsters Pension 
Fund (the “TPF”)—a multiemployer pension plan.67 At the time of acquisition, 
the Sun Funds received a 25% discount on the purchase price of SBI, due to 
the existence of SBI’s unfunded obligations to the plan.68 SCAI-affiliated 
consultants were involved in and informed of SBI’s decisions regarding 
 
 55. Id. 
 56. See id. at 134. 
 57. Id. at 142. 
 58. Id. at 133–36. 
 59. Sun Capital, 724 F.3d at 134. 
 60. Id. at 142. 
 61. Id. at 135. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 136. 
 64. Id. at 135. 
 65. Sun Capital, 724 F.3d at 143 n.19. 
 66. See id. at 142–43. 
 67. Id. at 132, 135. 
 68. Id. at 135. 
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business operations, personnel, capital expenditures, and financing through 
2007 and 2008.69 In the fall of 2008, inventory write-downs caused SBI to 
breach its loan covenants.70 Thereafter, SBI was unable to access the credit it 
needed to pay its bills, and it stopped making contributions to the TPF.71 SBI 
then became liable for its share of the TPF unfunded benefits.72 An involuntary 
bankruptcy proceeding was brought against SBI in November 2008, and the 
Sun Funds asserted that they lost their entire investment in SBI.73 
In December of 2008, the TPF sent a demand note to the Sun Funds 
requiring payment from them for the unfunded withdrawal liability owed to it 
by SBI.74 “[The] TPF asserted that the Sun Funds had entered into a 
partnership or joint venture in common control with SBI and were therefore 
jointly and severally liable for SBI’s withdrawal liability under” ERISA.75 
Under the respective statute, “to impose withdrawal liability on an organization 
other than the one obligated to the pension fund, two conditions must be met: 
(1) the organization must be under common control with the obligated 
organization, and (2) the organization must be a trade or business.”76 In June 
2010, the Sun Funds filed an action for declaratory judgment seeking 
declaration that they were not liable for SBI’s withdrawal liability.77 The 
Funds asserted that they did not meet either condition of the two-part test.78 
Congress gave the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation (PBGC) 
authority to prescribe regulations as to the meanings of “common control” and 
“trade or business,” but stipulated that any regulations “shall be consistent and 
coextensive with regulations prescribed for similar purposes [under the Internal 
Revenue Code].”79 However, no regulations were adopted to define “trade or 
business.”80 The Internal Revenue Code also does not define the term “trade or 
business.” Therefore, tax cases are the only related source of interpretation for 
the terms.81 The only ERISA-related guidance available was a 2007 PBGC 
 
 69. Id. at 134–36. 
 70. Id. at 136 (explaining that the write-downs were caused by declining copper prices). 
 71. Sun Capital, 724 F.3d at 136. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 136–37. The specific ERISA provision is 1301(b), but that is not relevant to this 
discussion. 
 76. Id. at 138. 
 77. Sun Capital, 724 F.3d at 137. 
 78. Id. The Sun Funds first sought to prove that they were not trades or businesses. They 
were successful at the district court. The TPF appealed bringing the case to the First Circuit. 
 79. Id. at 139. Because the PBGC adopted regulations pertaining to the meaning of 
“common control,” the meaning of that phrase was not an issue. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. The phrase “trade or business” is used thousands of times in the Internal Revenue 
Code. This is likely why the IRS and the courts have refrained from giving it a definitive 
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appeals letter, which purported to derive its trade or business test from 
Supreme Court tax precedent.82 However, the letter was denied validity by the 
district court.83 
After its own trade or business analysis, the district court granted SBI’s 
motion for summary judgment on the conclusion that the Funds were not 
trades or businesses.84 The court reached that conclusion “relying on the fact 
that the Sun Funds did not have any offices or employees, and did not make or 
sell goods or report income other than investment income on their tax 
returns.”85 Further, the court found that the Sun Funds were not involved in the 
general partner’s management of SBI.86 The First Circuit reversed the district 
court’s finding on this issue.87 
C. The First Circuit’s Trade or Business Analysis 
In reversing the district court, the First Circuit came up with the 
“investment plus test” to conclude that the general partner was engaged in a 
trade or business.88 Then, it applied agency principles to attribute the same 
conclusion to the limited partners.89 
Under the court’s investment plus approach, finding a trade or business 
requires continuous and regular activity, the intent to earn a profit, more than 
managerial attention to investments, and more than investment returns.90 
However, the court declined to provide specific factors for what satisfies the 
“plus,” or how much “more” is required. The test itself is derived from a string 
of tax cases—Higgins, Whipple, and Groetzinger—all of which contribute to 
the investment plus test and help inform the inquiry into the “plus” factor.91 
The test begins by employing principles from Commissioner v. 
Groetzinger, where the Supreme Court adopted a two-prong test to determine 
whether an activity was a trade or business: (1) the taxpayer must be involved 
in the activity with continuity and regularity, and (2) the taxpayer’s primary 
 
meaning—it may apply differently in different contexts. See id. at 137; Comm’r of Internal 
Revenue v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 35 (1987). 
 82. Sun Capital, 724 F.3d at 137. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. The First Circuit later characterized this reasoning as simplistic. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 129. 
 88. Sun Capital, 724 F.3d at 143. The court also noted that it would have reached the same 
conclusion without applying the investment plus test and analogized to a similar approach 
employed by the Seventh Circuit. 
 89. Id. at 147–48. 
 90. Id. at 144–45. 
 91. Id. at 146. The test was first developed by the PBGC in an appeals letter. Id. 
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purpose for engaging in the activity must be for income or profit.92 This rule 
serves as the threshold for the investment plus test. 
In Higgins v. Commissioner, an individual taxpayer sought to deduct 
expenses incurred in managing his large personal investment portfolio.93 The 
portfolio consisted of permanent investments in real estate, stocks, and 
bonds.94 The taxpayer rented offices, hired employees, and spent much of his 
own time managing the investments.95 The Supreme Court held that the 
taxpayer was not engaged in a trade or business, and therefore, Higgins could 
not deduct his management expenses.96 The Court ruled that managing one’s 
investments, while collecting interest and dividends, is not by itself sufficient 
to constitute a trade or business. The Court further stipulated that this was true 
regardless of the size of the investment or the continuous nature of the work 
required in its management.97 The Higgins Court also cautioned that 
determining whether or not a taxpayer’s activities are a trade or business 
requires an “examination of the facts in each case.”98 Most importantly, in 
Higgins, the taxpayer did not participate directly or indirectly in the 
management of the corporations in which he invested.99 Thus, Higgins carves 
out an exception to the Groetzinger test for passive investors. That is, those 
that provide only managerial attention to their investments are not engaged in a 
trade or business. 
In Whipple, an individual taxpayer sought to deduct a bad debt that he 
made to one of his corporations as a business expense.100 The taxpayer argued 
that because he furnished regular services to the corporation, he was engaged 
in a trade or business separate from that of the corporation.101 The Supreme 
Court explained that 
[d]evoting one’s time and energies to the affairs of a corporation is not of 
itself, and without more, a trade or business of the person so engaged. . . . 
When the only return is that of an investor, the taxpayer has not satisfied his 
burden of demonstrating that he is engaged in a trade or business since 
investing is not a trade or business and the return to the taxpayer, though 
 
 92. Id. at 139; Comm’r of Internal Revenue v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 35 (1987). 
 93. Higgins v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 61 S.Ct. 475, 478 (1941). 
 94. Id. at 476. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 478. 
 97. Id. 
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 99. Sun Capital Partners III, LP v. New England Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension 
Fund, 724 F.3d 129, 145 (1st Cir. 2013); see Higgins, 61 S.Ct. at 476. 
 100. Whipple v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 83 S.Ct. 1168, 1171 (1963). 
 101. Id. at 1174. 
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substantially the product of his services, legally arises not from his own trade 
or business but from that of the corporation.102 
The Sun Capital court interpreted Whipple to require that profits must be 
distinct from those that a normal investor would receive in order to find a trade 
or business.103 
In its analysis, the Sun Capital court first noted that the Sun Funds made 
investments in portfolio companies with the intent to earn a profit.104 The court 
then identified several factors or activities, which in sum satisfied the “plus” in 
the investment plus test.105 Much like the tax cases it purported to follow, the 
court cautioned that its analysis was very fact-specific106 and that no specific 
factor was dispositive.107 The relevant factors included: (1) the stated intent of 
the Sun Funds to seek out portfolio companies “that are in need of extensive 
intervention with respect to their management and operations, to provide such 
intervention, and then to sell the companies;”108 (2) the broad powers given to 
the general partners to manage the portfolio companies, including hiring, 
terminating, and compensating the companies’ agents;109 (3) the Sun Funds’ 
controlling interest in SBI, which allowed them to control the board by placing 
SCAI employees in two of the three board positions;110 and (4) the discount or 
“offset” for the management fees that one of the Funds (Sun Fund IV) owed 
the general partner’s management company.111 The offset was equal to 50% of 
the fees Scott Brass owed the management company.112 Notably, the court only 
found the Fund that received the fee offset to be a trade or business.113 The 
 
 102. Id. 
 103. Sun Capital, 724 F.3d at 146. The court likely interpreted Whipple too narrowly. See 
discussion infra. 
 104. Id. at 141 (“Profits [were] made from the sale of stock at higher prices than the purchase 
price and through dividends.”). 
 105. See id. at 141–43. 
 106. Id. at 141; see also Comm’r of Internal Revenue v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 36 (1987) 
(“We adhere to the general position of the Higgins Court, taken 46 years ago, that resolution of 
this issue ‘requires an examination of the facts in each case’” (citing Higgins v. Comm’r of 
Internal Revenue, 61 S.Ct. 475, 478 (1941))). 
 107. Sun Capital, 724 F.3d at 141. 
 108. Id. at 142. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 142–43 (noting that the intimate involvement in the management and operations of 
the company “goes well beyond that of a passive shareholder” and supports a conclusion that an 
organization is a “trade or business”). 
 111. Id. at 143. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Sun Capital, 724 F.3d at 143. 
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court reasoned that the offset constituted a direct economic benefit that an 
ordinary, passive investor would not receive.114 
The First Circuit then analogized to a Seventh Circuit case that employed 
similar factors, including “the stated intent in the creation of the enterprise,” 
“the enterprise’s legal form,” its tax treatment, and the fact that the entity in 
question was a “for-profit” organization.115 In fortifying its opinion, the court 
acknowledged that the Seventh Circuit’s analysis would have provided the 
same outcome as the investment plus approach.116 
The Sun Funds first argued that finding them to be trades or businesses 
would be inconsistent with Higgins and Whipple.117 In rejecting the Funds’ 
argument, the court relied partly on the Groetzinger Court’s hesitancy to 
express a uniform definition of the phrase “trade or business” within the 
IRC.118 The First Circuit also noted that the phrase is not required to be 
interpreted uniformly, only coextensively for ERISA and tax purposes.119 
Next, the Funds argued that because the investment plus test relied on 
Groetzinger, which stated that it was consistent with Higgins, they cannot be 
trades or businesses, because that interpretation would be inconsistent with 
Higgins and its progeny.120 The court denied the presence of such 
inconsistency, and distinguished the Sun Funds from both Higgins and 
Whipple, neither of which provided per se rules.121 
The First Circuit distinguished Higgins primarily based on the Sun Funds’ 
substantial participation in the management of SBI.122 The court distinguished 
Whipple based on the management fees the funds channeled to the general 
partner, and subsequent offset received by Sun Fund IV.123 The court 
emphasized the significance of the offset or discount, noting that Fund IV 
would otherwise have paid those fees to its general partner.124 Thus, the 
 
 114. Id. (explaining that the fee offset saved Sun Fund IV $186,368 in management fees it 
otherwise would have paid its general partner for managing the investment in SBI). 
 115. Id. at 143–44. 
 116. Id. at 143. 
 117. Id. at 144. 
 118. Id. at 145 (“We are particularly convinced this is this is the case because the Supreme 
Court has been hesitant to express a uniform definition even within the code itself.”) (citing 
Comm’r of Internal Revenue v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23 (1987)). 
 119. Sun Capital, 724 F.3d at 145. 
 120. Id. at 144; see also Comm’r of Internal Revenue v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23 (1987). 
 121. Sun Capital, 724 F.3d at 145; see also Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23 (following Higgins to 
require a fact specific inquiry); see also Higgins v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 61 S.Ct. 475 
(1941) (requiring a fact-specific inquiry). 
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discount was an economic benefit that a normal investor would not receive.125 
This benefit seemed to convince the court that Whipple’s “without more” 
hurdle was cleared, and thus separated Fund IV from passive investor status. 
The First Circuit concluded its investment plus analysis by noting that it is 
consistent with the test established in the line of tax cases—Higgins, Whipple, 
and Groetzinger.126 According to the First Circuit’s analysis, those cases 
collectively say that each case requires an examination of the facts, and 
providing mere managerial attention while receiving only investment returns, 
without more does not constitute a trade or business, even if the activity is 
engaged in for profit, and continuous and regular.127 In Sun Capital, the court’s 
investment plus test, simply put, found more.128 The Funds provided greater 
management of the investment than in Higgins, and one Fund received returns 
that investors do not, thus satisfying Whipple. 
D. The Court’s Agency Analysis 
Instead of stopping at the general partner level, the Sun Capital court took 
the issue a step further by applying agency principles to attribute the acts of the 
general partners in managing the Sun Funds to the Funds themselves.129 The 
court did so by first applying Delaware partnership law, which makes the acts 
of one partner attributable to the partnership, if completed while carrying on in 
the ordinary course of the partnership’s business.130 Next, the court pointed to 
the Sun Funds’ limited partnership agreements, which provided the general 
partners with exclusive and broad authority to manage and effectuate the 
Funds’ purposes.131 The court also noted that even without applying 
partnership law, the general partners’ agreements create actual authority for the 
 
 125. See id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Higgins v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 61 S.Ct. 475, 478 (1941) (“To determine 
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 129. Sun Capital, 724 F.3d at 146–47. 
 130. Id. at 147. 
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general partners to act on behalf of the portfolio companies.132 The Sun Funds 
argued that the general partner entered into service agreements with SBI on its 
own behalf, and not as an agent of the Funds.133 The court found that argument 
unpersuasive for two reasons.134 First, the court noted that it was within the 
general partner’s authority as a partner in the Funds’ limited partnership to 
provide management services to SBI.135 Second, because providing the 
management services was done on behalf of, and for the benefit of, the Sun 
Funds, the requisite principal-agent relationship was established, and the acts 
of the general partners as agents were attributable to the Funds.136 This was 
true because the Funds had no employees of their own. Therefore, their stated 
purposes could only be achieved by the acts of agents.137 Hence, the reason for 
the signing of the service contract between the management company and SBI 
immediately after SBI’s acquisition was that the Funds simply could not act 
without hiring agents.138 Additionally, the fee offset received by one of the 
Funds provided an economic benefit by reducing its expenses.139 The court 
noted, “[t]he services paid for by SBI were the same services that the Sun 
Funds would otherwise have paid for themselves to implement and oversee an 
operating strategy at SBI.”140 
E. The First Circuit’s Holding in Sun Capital 
Because under Section 1301(b)(1) an employer must be a trade or 
business, the First Circuit reversed the district court’s entry of summary 
judgment in favor of Sun Fund IV—the Fund that received the fee offset.141 
The court vacated the entry of summary judgment in favor of Sun Fund III and 
remanded for a determination of whether the Fund received any economic 
benefit from an offset that a typical investor would not.142 Therefore, the court 
only determined that Sun Fund IV was a trade or business.143 The court also 
acknowledged that its investment plus test leaves grey area as to where the line 
should be drawn between a passive investor and a trade or business.144 
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III.  APPLYING SUN CAPITAL TO TAX LAW: PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS ARE 
TRADES OR BUSINESSES FOR TAX PURPOSES 
Although not a tax case, Sun Capital is significant in the tax context. First, 
by basing its reasoning on established tax law, the First Circuit laid a 
foundation of how such law can be applied to determine that private equity is a 
business. Second, because Sun Capital does not create tax precedent, future 
courts addressing the issue in tax contexts are free to adjust the reasoning. 
Finally, in keeping with the spirit of Groetzinger, the First Circuit’s reasoning 
aligns with common sense. Private equity funds search for and acquire a 
controlling interest in struggling companies, and then rework the companies 
from the inside out in order to sell them for a profit. The fact that they use 
complex organizational structures and arrange for subsidiaries and other agents 
to actually do the work does not change that. Private equity funds are in the 
trade or business of developing corporations for profit. Yet, they avoid the 
classification of trade or business because the industry has been successful in 
masking the simple reality of what they do through sophisticated structuring. 
Much of this intricacy aims to prevent tax and other liability.145 Meanwhile, 
the tax code and tax courts routinely assess situations by employing a 
substance-over-form approach.146 The following argument outlines how courts 
should follow Sun Capital’s lead and apply common sense to parse through the 
complexity and classify businesses that make billions of dollars per year as 
businesses for tax purposes. 
A. The Tax Law 
Sun Capital correctly began its inquiry with the test provided in 
Groetzinger. To be deemed a trade or business, a taxpayer must be engaged in 
the activity with continuity and regularity, and with the intent to earn a 
profit.147 In Groetzinger, the taxpayer gambled on dog races for sixty to eighty 
hours per week with a goal of earning a living.148 When he netted a gambling 
loss for the year he sought to attribute it to a trade or business.149 The Supreme 
Court allowed the deduction, and stated that it was applying a common sense 
 
 145. Rosenthal, supra note 8. 
 146. 26 U.S.C. § 7701(o) (2012) (The “economic substance doctrine” is the common law 
doctrine under which tax benefits under subtitle A with respect to a transaction are not allowable 
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 147. Sun Capital, 724 F.3d at 139; Comm’r of Internal Revenue v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 
35 (1987). 
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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
480 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXIV:465 
approach to determining what is a trade or business.150 It reasoned that the 
activity required skill, which the taxpayer applied in a constant and large-scale 
effort for the purpose of earning a living.151 The Groetzinger Court also 
cautioned that it was not overruling or cutting back on Higgins.152 In fact, the 
Court reinforced the Higgins requirement that a trade or business inquiry 
“requires an examination of the facts in each case.”153 
In a rather bare-bones opinion, the Higgins154 Court refrained from setting 
forth elements, in addition to profit motive and regularity, that are required to 
render an activity a trade or business.155 Instead, the Court deferred to the 
Bureau of Internal Revenue to determine what is carrying on a business.156 The 
commissioner argued “that mere [personal] investment activities never 
constitute carrying on a trade or business, no matter how much of one’s time or 
of one’s employees’ time they may occupy.”157 Without engaging in its own 
analysis, the Supreme Court held that “[n]o matter how large the [estate] or 
how continuous or extended the work required may be, such facts are not 
sufficient [to constitute a trade or business].”158 Notably, in Groetzinger, which 
relied on Higgins, the issue was again personal.159 Therefore, Higgins should 
only apply in cases where the investments are of a personal nature to an 
individual taxpayer. Most importantly, Eugene Higgins did not participate 
directly or indirectly in the management of the corporations in which he 
invested.160 The managerial attention referred to in the Higgins case was 
applied to his portfolio in general. Moreover, the repeated judicial direction to 
conduct a fact-specific inquiry shows that courts are hesitant to establish a 
broad rule. This is likely because they believe their outcomes would vary with 
even slight factual differences. For example, in the case of private equity, the 
entity in question is not an individual investing on his or her own behalf, but 
on the behalf of other individuals, funds, and businesses. 
In Whipple, the taxpayer promoted and maintained several corporations. 
A.J. Whipple claimed to be in the trade or business of serving his corporations 
for the purpose of deriving future income through those corporations’ trades or 
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businesses.161 The Supreme Court found that he did not engage in a trade or 
business of his own, and denied his claimed bad-debt deduction for a loan 
made to one of his corporations.162 The Court held that Whipple’s intent to 
derive income based on the future success of his corporations was not a trade 
or business distinct from that of the corporations.163 Instead, the Court 
classified Whipple as an investor, which does not rise to the level of trade or 
business. In other words, Whipple distinguishes the activity of developing 
corporations to derive long-term164 income from developing corporations to 
derive income from their sale.165 The Whipple Court also hinted that the 
presence of more than one corporation might support a finding of a trade or 
business.166 Therefore, according to Whipple, absent additional evidence, 
furnishing management and other services to corporations for income akin to 
that of an investor is not a trade or business.167 However, the intent to earn a 
profit on the sale of corporations, and the presence of multiple corporations, in 
addition to providing management and other services, might provide this 
additional evidence. 
The Whipple Court specifically distinguished Giblin v. Commissioner to 
arrive at its decision, distinguishing sales income from investment income. In 
Giblin, the taxpayer claimed to be in the business of seeking out businesses, 
promoting them, and investing both capital and time in them before selling 
them for a profit or loss. The Fifth Circuit found Vincent Giblin to be engaged 
in a trade or business.168 
Courts take Giblin and Whipple together to provide the rule for 
determining whether a taxpayer is engaged in the trade or business of 
promoting, organizing, financing, and/or dealing in corporations.169 That is, to 
qualify as a separate business, apart from the corporation itself, the activity 
must be conducted for a fee or commission, or with the immediate intent to sell 
the corporation at a profit in the ordinary course of that business.170 Deely v. 
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Commissioner provided an example of a sale that was not immediate enough to 
qualify as income different from investment income. To constitute a trade or 
business, Deely required the taxpayer to show that the entities were developed 
with a view to a quick and profitable sale after each business had become 
established, rather than with a view to long-range investment gains.171 The 
taxpayer asserted that his activities were in the trade or business of promoting, 
organizing, financing, and/or dealing in corporations.172 However, he held only 
one of his sixteen profitable entities for less than six years, while holding the 
rest for periods between seventeen and thirty-nine years.173 The court denied 
his bad-debt deduction based on its finding that he did not engage in the trade 
or business of dealing in corporations.174 The court reasoned that an early 
resale shows that the profit is income received directly from services to the 
business.175 On the other hand, an interest held for longer periods (like 
Deely’s) shows that it is serving as an investment, with the returns tied to the 
success of the business.176 The court reasoned that Deely only sold the 
unprofitable businesses that would not serve as successful long-term 
investments, and held on to the profitable businesses that would.177 The Deely 
court took a very fact-specific approach as it looked past the taxpayer’s actions 
to the intent underlying those actions. 
B. Analysis: The Tax Law Applied to Private Equity 
Private equity funds meet the Groetzinger test of being engaged in the 
activity with continuity and regularity with intent to earn a profit. Funds apply 
constant and large-scale efforts evidenced by the industry’s enormous 
profits.178 Fund managers and their agents work to improve the value of their 
companies in order to sell them for the production of income.179 The IRS and 
future courts should follow Groetzinger’s common sense, fact-specific 
approach in determining whether private equity funds are trades or businesses. 
Higgins should not shield private equity funds from common sense. Private 
equity funds are not personal investments. They are comprised of numerous 
investors, many of which are businesses and other types of institutional 
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funds.180 Therefore, they should not be protected by the Higgins exclusion for 
personal investments. Moreover, the Sun Capital court distinguished Higgins’s 
lack of participation in the corporations he invested in from the Sun Funds’ 
material participation in SBI. The IRS and future courts should likewise 
distinguish the material and substantial work private equity funds engage in to 
restructure their businesses. The managerial attention referred to in Higgins 
should be thought of as applying to his portfolio in general, while private 
equity funds actually manage the companies they invest in. Courts should 
apply Groetzinger’s common sense approach with Higgins’s fact-specific 
inquiry. If they did, like Sun Capital, they would find that because private 
equity funds are paid to develop corporations for other individuals and 
businesses, they are different from a single individual managing his or her 
estate. 
Private equity funds engage in the trade or business of developing 
corporations under the rule prescribed by Whipple, Giblin, and Deely. Earning 
a fee, commission, or revenue from the sale of a corporation distinguishes 
those engaged in the business of developing corporations from mere investors. 
To be considered a sale, as opposed to an investment, the holding period must 
be short. The presence of multiple corporations also cuts towards finding a 
trade or business. Therefore, by requiring a fee or commission to find that Sun 
Fund IV was a trade or business,181 the Sun Capital court read Whipple too 
narrowly. Whipple also stated income in the form of “profit on their sale” 
could show compensation other than normal investor returns.182 Both Sun 
Funds invested in multiple corporations that they intended to sell in the short 
term. Industry wide, private equity firms invest in companies with the intent to 
resell their investments for a profit within three to seven years.183 During the 
investment period, private equity firms place strategies and management teams 
in companies in order to improve their performance.184 Moreover, funds invest 
in several companies simultaneously. Therefore, in a fact-specific inquiry, 
private equity funds satisfy Whipple, Giblin, and Deely, because they 
contribute substantial work to develop multiple corporations for a profit on 
their sale, in the short term. 
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IV.  WHY SUN CAPITAL MATTERS: A POLICY DISCUSSION 
As previously noted, the current treatment of private equity’s income as 
capital gains is a significant tax advantage. Classifying private equity firms as 
trades or businesses would likely cause the industry to lose this treatment. 
Opponents of the treatment have lauded the First Circuit for its finding in Sun 
Capital, and now point to the IRS and the Obama administration to make the 
next move.185 Proponents of private equity have downplayed the decision, 
highlighting the fact that it is an ERISA case that cannot be implicated to 
change “settled” tax law.186 
Examining the policy arguments over private equity’s tax treatment sheds 
light on why opponents are pointing to Sun Capital as a turning point, while 
the private equity industry simultaneously downplays its relevance. It is 
important to note, however, that the Sun Capital court somewhat blurred a 
fundamental distinction. That is, the difference between finding a fund’s 
general partner versus an entire fund to be a trade or business. In Sun Capital, 
the pervasive control exerted over the funds by the general partners played a 
large part in finding the Funds, instead of just the general partners, to be trades 
or businesses. To reach its conclusion, the court comingled the acts of the 
general partners and the Funds themselves through agency principles. In policy 
terms, this comingling elevates the debate from the taxation of carried 
interest187 to the taxation of entire private equity funds. Politicians, courts, and 
the press often criticize the treatment of carried interest as capital gains, but 
few have echoed the complaint in reference to the returns of limited 
partners.188 Opponents of the tax break point to common sense, congressional 
intent, and fairness.189 Proponents of private equity cite settled tax law, 
corporate formalities, and investment incentive.190 The next sections assess the 
corresponding arguments presented by both sides. 
A. Common Sense v. Settled Tax Law 
Because the taxation of private equity relies on the funds being classified 
as passive investors, opponents of this classification argue that it simply defies 
common sense.191 As previously discussed, the relevant tax precedent suggests 
that if a taxpayer has a profit motive, engages in the activity with continuity 
and regularity, provides more than managerial attention, and earns more than 
 
 185. Davidoff, supra note 8; Rosenthal, supra note 8, at 1466. 
 186. Judge, supra note 8. 
 187. Carried interest is the general partner’s share of partnership profits. For a discussion of 
the taxation of carried interest see generally Fleischer, supra note 24. 
 188. See generally Fleischer, supra note 24. 
 189. Solomon, supra note 8; Rosenthal, supra note 8, at 1467. 
 190. Judge, supra note 8. 
 191. Rosenthal, supra note 8, at 1467. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2015] A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION 485 
normal investment returns, then he or she is more than a passive investor and 
engages in a trade or business.192 Private equity’s own lobbying organization 
states that “[c]arried interest is provided to the general partner in recognition of 
the substantial and material work required to restructure and direct the 
investments of the fund.”193 On its face, this language, as a general 
characterization of the industry, suggests that private equity funds provide 
more than mere managerial attention like that of a passive investor—they also 
conduct substantial and material work to improve the value of the companies. 
Therefore, opponents argue that treating private equity firms like passive 
investors for tax purposes runs contrary to common sense, and provides an 
undeserved tax windfall to an industry comprised of billionaires.194 In fact, 
even some private equity managers have admitted that they cannot justify the 
favorable treatment. For example, Peter Peterson, cofounder of the Blackstone 
Group, one of the world’s most profitable private equity funds, stated: 
I think if you make an investment with cash and you get a return, that should 
be capital gains. If you’re a hedge fund and a private equity fund and you get 
your carried interest taxed at capital gains, I can’t justify that, because it’s a 
payment for services, and it ought to be taxed as income tax.195 
Defenders of private equity’s taxation, namely Steve Judge, president and 
chief executive of the Private Equity Growth Capital Council, dismissed the 
relevance of Sun Capital, saying “[t]he notion that a case involving [ERISA] 
could be interpreted as a tax case to change settled carried-interest tax law 
requires . . . many leaps of faith (and logic) that run counter to several 
important facts.”196 In his dismissal, Judge first seems to suggest that by 
limiting the holding to ERISA, the First Circuit barred other courts and the IRS 
from applying its reasoning. While the court did confine its holding to ERISA, 
the very tax cases underlying the court’s reasoning initially applied only to tax 
law.197 Thus, in citing Groetzinger, Whipple, and Higgins, the Sun Capital 
court illustrates how courts routinely use parallel reasoning when faced with 
the same or similar issues under varying areas of law. While Judge is correct 
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that Sun Capital is not binding tax law, that fact is certainly not a bar to 
applying the court’s reasoning in other contexts, including future private equity 
tax cases, Treasury Regulations, or congressional enactments. After all, the 
same exact phrase—trade or business—is used in both contexts, and the 
ERISA legislation references the tax code’s use of the phrase. 
Judge later states that private equity “appropriately” treats the income 
derived from selling the stock of improved companies as capital gains.198 He 
supports this conclusion by stating that the stock is a capital asset.199 However, 
Judge stops short of explaining the appropriateness of this capital asset 
treatment. Instead, Judge skips this step, and asserts that “the income tax code 
has appropriately recognized since its inception, the sale of a capital asset 
creates a capital gain or loss, and that treatment flows through to the partners in 
the firm.”200 While accurate, Judge’s statement is incomplete. It is helpful, 
however, at illustrating two weak points in private equity’s argument. Most 
importantly, the explanation that Judge skipped would, of course, center on the 
definition of a capital asset, a discussion the industry is hoping to avoid, 
especially after Sun Capital. Second, Judge and other proponents of private 
equity’s capital asset classification reason that because the law has allowed the 
classification, it must be correct and should continue. However, the 
classification has rarely been tested.201 Due to limited IRS resources and the 
large size of private equity partnerships, funds are seldomly audited. The fact 
that an ERISA case revived a tax policy debate202 shows that in a rare 
challenge, private equity’s stance may not be as sure as the industry proclaims. 
B. Congressional Intent v. Agency Principles 
Another thing Steve Judge’s Dealbook article did not do was assert that the 
tax code has, since its inception, consistently defined the term capital asset. 
That is not the case. Legislative history and Congressional intent illustrate that 
Congress did not intend to create a tax advantage for private equity funds. The 
preference for capital gains was initially added to encourage the sale of capital 
assets in order to raise tax revenue.203 Without the preference, taxpayers were 
discouraged from selling assets they had owned for long periods, because they 
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would owe tax on the entire appreciation in value in the year of disposition.204 
Part of Congress’s impetus in the reduced rate was, in fact, to collect revenue 
by encouraging the sale of assets.205 Initially, any property held for profit or 
investment, with the exception of inventory, was a capital asset.206 However, 
this definition was too broad, and taxpayers took advantage of the preference. 
For example, the sale of real estate, which was not inventory, but was often 
held in a business, was taxed as capital gain.207 To tighten the requirements for 
an asset to qualify as capital, Congress added an exclusion from the definition 
of a capital asset for “[property] held primarily for sale in the course of a trade 
or business.”208 However, the addition of this broad exclusion from the 
definition of capital asset meant property held in a trade or business was taxed 
at ordinary rates.209 This allowed traders engaged in the business of buying and 
selling stocks and bonds to deduct losses sustained in the markets from 
ordinary sources of income like salaries and rents.210 For example, Wall Street 
bankers could deduct trading losses from their salaries. Because the effect on 
tax revenue was substantial, Congress added the words “to customers” after 
“property held primarily for sale.”211 Again, Congress changed the law of 
capital gains based on tax revenue concerns, not to incentivize private equity 
funds to invest. 
The current definition of capital asset under section 1221(a)(1) excludes 
property held by the taxpayer for sale to customers in the ordinary course of 
his trade or business.212 Because private equity funds do not consider the stock 
of investment companies held for sale to customers, and do not consider funds 
to be trades or businesses, they enjoy a substantial tax advantage. 
To arrive at the conclusion that the Sun Funds were engaged in a trade or 
business, the First Circuit applied agency law to attribute the acts of a general 
partner to the funds.213 This would also be required in a tax context. To find 
that the stock held by the funds is not a capital asset because it is held for sale 
to customers in a trade or business would require a court to attribute the acts of 
the general partner and management companies hired by the general partner to 
the funds. Defenders of private equity argue that such an application of agency 
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law is flawed and requires one to ignore corporate formalities.214 However, as 
Rosenthal explains, “fund structures . . . are complicated, with layers and 
layers of entities, domestic and foreign, without apparent purpose, apart from 
tax and regulatory avoidance.”215 Moreover, courts evaluating tax questions 
often see through comparable confusion by applying a substance-over-form 
approach.216 For example, the Sun Capital court focused heavily on the fact 
that the Funds did not have any employees, and therefore, could not act, except 
for through an agent. Further, in tax cases, courts have held that “activities 
performed on behalf of a principal by an independent contractor must be 
attributed to the principal even if there is no actual agent.”217 Even those who 
have downplayed Sun Capital’s applicability to tax law recognize that the 
attribution of a general partner’s acts to the funds themselves is a thorny 
issue.218 For example, Lee Sheppard, in his Tax Notes article, admitted, 
the tax law has no good explanation of what should be the treatment of active 
investors who get their hands dirty running portfolio companies and accept 
fees for services, but do not become employees of those companies. They wear 
a lot of hats, which make their investors vulnerable to agency arguments.219 
In the end, despite its trial and error, Congress’s original intent in taxing 
capital gains at a preferable rate was to raise revenue. The definition of capital 
asset has been revised several times in order to limit unintended loopholes and 
means by which taxpayers have discovered to lower their tax bills. Therefore, 
private equity should not be able to form hollow entities and contract around 
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the actual substance of their businesses in order to enjoy lower tax rates than 
average, working-class Americans.220 
C. Fairness v. Incentive to Invest 
Opponents of private equity’s income classification see this tax windfall as 
unfair. The subject of private equity’s tax break made headlines during the 
2012 presidential election when the public discovered that billionaire 
presidential candidate Mitt Romney’s 2011 effective tax rate was 14.1%.221 
Like other private equity managers, Romney enjoys a tax rate lower than most 
middle-class Americans because his work—managing multibillion-dollar 
investment funds—is characterized as passive, and given favorable treatment 
as capital gains under the tax code’s current classification.222 
The fairness argument requires deciding whether it is a good idea to 
provide tax incentives to induce investment. The current legislative regime 
answers generally, yes. This is one reason why capital gains receive favorable 
treatment under the tax code. However, the general favor granted to capital 
gains can be distinguished from its use by private equity funds. “Private equity 
is just that: private.”223 That is, private equity is an exclusive investment 
vehicle for extremely wealthy individuals, businesses, and other funds such as 
endowments and pension plans. While working-class Americans may see 
indirect benefits of private equity investing, they are generally denied access to 
the lucrative investment opportunity. Considering that private equity has 
outpaced the S&P Index by 6.9% over the last ten years, the privilege of 
investing in private equity is substantial. 224 
To decide whether providing private equity with a tax incentive to invest 
merits favorable treatment, it is insightful to look at the recent trends in United 
States income inequality. Over the last thirty years, income inequality and, 
more importantly, wealth inequality in the United States has grown 
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dramatically.225 The government, through both tax and monetary policy, has 
contributed to the widening gap between the nation’s wealthiest individuals 
and everyone else.226 The policy of providing favorable tax treatment to 
income derived from the sale of a capital asset, namely stock, provides a larger 
benefit to the wealthiest Americans, because they hold the overwhelming 
majority of stock.227 Because the Federal Reserve’s recent monetary policy has 
substantially bolstered equity markets, the two policies should be considered in 
concert when assessing their effects on inequality, and whether or not private 
equity should retain its favorable treatment. 
In short, through asset inflation, the monetary policy has increased the 
value of stocks—which are held predominately by the rich—and the tax policy 
allows income from the sale of stock to be taxed at lower rates than wages 
earned by the majority of Americans. By holding interest rates low and 
conducting quantitative easing, the Federal Reserve has decreased the 
purchasing power of wage-earning Americans and increased the income of the 
wealthy.228 The Fed’s goal is to spur steady inflation by providing the economy 
with means to grow. Low interest rates make it cheap for businesses to borrow 
money, and quantitative easing or bond buying provides the economy with 
capital to expand. In a perfect world, businesses would expand in ways that 
decrease the unemployment rate and cause both wage and asset inflation. 
However, in reality, wages have not increased. In fact, real income, adjusted 
for inflation,229 has declined since 2008. On the other hand, asset inflation 
(primarily in stock) has occurred. In 2013 the stock market underwent record 
gains.230 The Fed’s policy, as intended, has also caused modest, yet steady, 
inflation in consumer goods.231 However, consumer price increases outpaced 
wage increases by 6.8 percentage points from 2007 to 2012.232 Therefore, 
businesses are not employing capital in ways that increase employee wages, 
but are employing capital to inflate the value of stock, and thus the returns to 
those who sell inflated stock. Monetary economist Milton Freidman once said, 
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“inflation is taxation without legislation.”233 Taken literally, that proposition is 
holding true for the majority of Americans, excluding the wealthiest, which is 
also the group benefiting from private equity’s tax break. 
Still, those that consider private equity’s tax break unfair must also 
recognize the benefits of providing incentives for investing. Private equity 
invested $87 billion in the United States during the third quarter of 2013 
alone.234 Almost 18,000 companies backed by private equity employ 7.5 
million employees in the United States.235 While opponents also cite the 
negative impacts some private equity funds inflict on the economy, there is no 
denying that the industry generates excellent returns for investors. 
Many of those investors are tax-exempt entities, government pension 
plans, and employee retirement investment funds.236 The private equity 
industry and its defenders insist that taxing the income of private equity funds 
as ordinary would decrease the returns to those investors.237 While this is true 
to some extent, it is not contrary to congressional intent. For example, Steven 
Rosenthal explains that Congress added Unrelated Business Income Tax 
(UBIT) to charitable organizations in order to place them on equal footing with 
their for-profit counterparts.238 In doing so, Congress excluded dividends and 
other revenues from UBIT, but subjected gains or losses from the sale of 
property primarily held for sale to customers in the ordinary course of a trade 
or business to UBIT.239 Rosenthal, in his Tax Notes article, provides a more 
extensive discussion on the subject, as well as the effect a change in treatment 
would have on foreign investors. At bottom, Congress did not intend for 
nonprofit entities to obtain an advantage over private businesses in areas that 
are not specific to their purpose. 
Much of the reason private equity has outpaced other investment vehicles 
can likely be attributed to the tax advantage the industry has over similar 
businesses.240 Income from similar businesses taxed as corporations is taxed 
twice by the time their investor’s receive it: first at the business’s level, and 
second at the individual investor’s level as dividends. While the single taxation 
of partnerships is a primary reason businesses (of all industries) organize as 
partnerships, private equity also has a tax advantage over other partnerships. 
Income from other partnerships engaged in trade or businesses are taxed at 
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ordinary levels. Because private equity is not considered a trade or business, its 
income is taxed at capital gains rates. However if private equity investing is 
truly as valuable as the industry portrays, returns should still be substantial, 
even if it were to lose this tax advantage.241 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Currently, private equity enjoys a significant tax benefit because funds 
have been successful at employing Higgins as a shield to trade or business 
status, and courts have not often been called to weigh in on the issue. Given the 
opportunity, the Sun Capital court took a step in the right direction and 
distinguished the Sun Funds from the individual investor in Higgins. Sun 
Capital provides the IRS with support to change its stance on what is a trade or 
business. Private equity would undoubtedly challenge any such change. Like 
Sun Capital, future courts should start the analysis with Groetzinger, and then 
distinguish private equity funds from Higgins. However, they should also 
apply Whipple, Giblin, and Deely to classify funds that develop corporations 
for the purposes of earning a profit on the sale thereof as trades or businesses. 
As noted above, stripping private equity of its capital gains treatment 
would also require a second step. The IRS would also need to classify the stock 
they hold to be held for sale to customers. This could be done through Treasury 
Regulations. 
Congress never intended to provide private equity with a tax break. 
Further, while the Fed did not intend for its monetary policy to provide private 
equity with an advantage over average Americans, quantitative easing has had 
that effect. The Fed is currently tapering off quantitative easing. The IRS and 
courts should play their respective roles and classify private equity as trades or 
businesses to prevent the industry from enjoying an unfair advantage. 
Following Groetzinger’s common sense approach, private equity operates like 
a business, earns revenue like a business, and should also be taxed like a 
business. 
RICHARD BAILEY* 
 
 
 241. James Surowiecki, Private Inequity, NEW YORKER, Jan. 30, 2012, http://www.newyork 
er.com/talk/financial/2012/01/30/120130ta_talk_surowiecki. 
* Juris Doctor, Saint Louis University School of Law, expected May 2015. 
